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RECENT BOOKS 
BooK R.Evrnws 
TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL. By Edward Ross 
Aranow and Herbert A. Einhorn. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 1973. Pp. xiii, 352. $40. 
Tender Offers for Corporate Control is a most topical addition 
to the growing list of specialized securities regulation treatises. Prior 
to 1960, the American method of changing corporate control was 
the proxy fight. In the sixties, however, the bull market, easy money, 
and the conglomerate craze combined to popularize the cash take-
over bid or-as it is frequently called-the tender offer. By 1966, 
corporations were making more than 100 takeover bids a year,1 and 
an annual aggregate of more than 1,000,000,000 dollars was in-
volved.2 The cash takeover had arrived. Management was threatened. 
Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey rose to the occasion. 
In October 1965, the Williams bill3 was introduced. Its stated pur-
pose was to protect management from industrial sabotage resulting 
from reckless corporate raids on proud old companies.4 By the time 
of its enactment in July 1968, however, the Williams bill was in-
tended to do more than defend entrenched management. The House 
Report stated that the bill "avoids tipping the balance of regula-
tion either in favor of management or in favor of the person making 
the takeover bid. It is designed to require full and fair disclosure 
for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing the 
offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their 
case."5 
The Williams Act6 added five new provisions to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934: sections 13(d), 13(e), 14(d), 14(e), and 14(f).7 
In general, the new provisions regulate the terms on which tender 
offers can be made, require specific disclosures by potential offerors 
and similar disclosures by purchasers within ten days after acquisi-
tion of five per cent8 of any class of registered equity securities, 
proscribe fraud in connection with tender offers, authorize SEC rule-
!. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968). 
2. See 113 CONG. REc. 24664-65 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams). 
3. 5. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). 
4. Ill CoNG. REc. 28257-60 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Williams). 
5. H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note I, at 4. 
6. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454. 
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d}-(f) (1970). 
8. A 1970 amendment reduced this figure from 10 per cent, as originally enacted. 
Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497, amending Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970). 
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making with respect to the repurchase by corporations of their own 
securities, and require proxy-statement-type disclosure in connection 
with a change of a majority of the directors following a tak.eover.9 
Aranow and Einhorn, practitioners with broad experience in 
tender offers and proxy fights and authors of Proxy Contests for 
Corporate Control,10 have written a treatise that covers substantially 
all of the questions involved in a tender offer. The practical is in-
terspersed with the legal in a well-coordinated pattern. The financial 
and market considerations necessary to identify an appropriate 
target and determine whether and at what price it is vulnerable to a 
takeover bid are discussed in summary form. The tender-offer team 
of fawyer, investment banker, dealer-manager, professional proxy-
soliciting firm, public relations man, and depository bank are iden-
tified and their roles explained. The essential position of arbitrageurs 
in tender offers is treated in a chapter prepared with the assistance 
of a partner of one of the leading arbitrage firms. There is also a 
comprehensive discussion of tactics to use in defense against a 
takeover bid. 
The core of the book is a detailed discussion of the provisions 
9. Section 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970), requires a "person" (defined to include a 
"group" acting in concert) making a tender offer that would result in the offeror's 
ownership of more than five per cent of the shares of the target company to disclose 
concurrently the offeror's identity and background; the source and amount of the funds 
to be used to pay for the tendered shares; if the purpose of the tender is control of 
the target; any plans for liquidation, merger, or other major change in the business or 
corporate structure of the target; the number of shares the offeror presently owns; 
and any contracts or understandings with other persons with respect to any securities 
of the target. In addition to requiring disclosure, section 14(d) substantively regulates 
tender offers by requiring that (1) tendering shareholders be permitted to withdraw 
tendered shares during the first seven days of the offer or after sixty days if the 
offeror has not purchased or returned the shares by then, thereby providing an oppor-
tunity for tendering shareholders to change their minds after reflection and preventing 
indefinite lockups; (2) if more shares are tendered than are to be purchased, the 
offeror purchase on a pro rata basis from among all shares tendered during the first 
ten days of the offer, thereby preventing a first-come-first-served stampede by share-
holders anxious to have their shares accepted; and (3) any increase in the tender price 
be paid to all tendering shareholders, including those accepted at the lower price, 
thereby assuring equal treatment of all shareholders. 
Section 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970), requires the same disclosure of identity, 
financing, purpose, holdings, and understandings by any person (again including a 
"group") who acquires more than five per cent of the shares of a corporation. The 
disclosure must be made within ten days after the five per cent threshold is reached. 
The purpose of this requirement is to alert the corporation, its shareholders, and the 
market in general to the fact of the acquisition and the purchaser's plans. 
Section 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970), is a general antifraud provision. It pro-
scribes material misstatements, misleading omissions, and fraudulent or manipulative 
acts in connection with a tender offer. 
The SEC rulemaking authority with respect to repurchase of stocks by a corporation 
is contained in section 13(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1970). 
Section 14(£), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(f) (1970), deals with planned changes in boards of 
directors following takeovers. 
10. E • .ARANOW &: H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1957) (2d 
ed. 1968). 
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of the Williams Act and the SEC regulations with respect to tender 
offers. The principal issues are raised; the legislative history, court 
decisions, and SEC interpretations are noted. 
Unfortunately for the reader, the book's August 31, 1972, cutoff 
date results in the omission of the bumper crop of 1973 tender offer 
cases. A series of 1973 decisions have made the Williams Act an 
almost impossible barrier to contested takeovers. The courts have 
now done what Congress refused to do; they have made the Wil-
liams Act a shield for entrenched management against "reckless cor-
porate raids on proud old companies." The Act, as recently con-
strued, will bar contested takeovers whether or not management has 
performed well and whether or not a majority of the shareholders 
wish to accept the offer. The 1973 decisions have been recognized by 
Wall Street. Arbitrageurs now sit back until they see the target's 
defensive team, particularly the lawyer. If the target is determined 
and represented by counsel experienced in takeover defense, the 
arbitrageurs will not buy to tender and a major battle of the takeover 
war is thus lost at the outset. Indeed, one member of the New York 
Bar has become so renowned for his successful defense against take-
overs that the first question on Wall Street is which side has him. 
As Aranow and Einhorn recognize, the key to takeover defense 
under the Williams Act is the requirement that the offeror disclose 
the purpose of the offer and that there be no material misstatement 
or misleading omission in such disclosure. However, as the book 
necessarily fails to convey, this year's decisions, particularly in the 
Second Circuit, have given such a broad sweep to this requirement 
that one must doubt the practicality of the takeover bid as a means 
of changing control. Injunctions have been issued for failure to dis-
close that an offeror, ostensibly seeking only twenty per cent of the 
target and disclaiming all but investment intent, had a history of 
expanding minority interests into complete acquisition;11 for failure 
to disclose that the acquisition of shares of the target might be an 
antitrust violation;12 for failure to disclose that the purchase of the 
target's stock pursuant to the tender offer might reduce the stock's 
float to the point where sfock exchange delisting would be con-
sidered;13 for failure to disclose a possible intention to use the liquid 
assets of the target, inferred from the offeror's action in an unrelated 
acquisition three years earlier;14 for failure to disclose that a foreign-
controlled offeror might be required under the laws of its parent's 
11. Gulf 8: Western Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. 8: Pac. Tea Co,, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 
1973). 
12. Gulf &: Western Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 
1973). 
13. Sonesta Intl. Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, CCH FED. SEC, L. REP. 
11 94,041 (2d Cir. 1973). 
14. General Host Corp. v, Triumph Am,, Inc., 359 F,Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), 
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domicile to follow certain dividend and investment policies;15 for 
failure to disclose an offeror's financial position where that informa-
tion was not publicly available and the offeror sought control 
through acquisition of less than all shares and contemplated a mer-
ger with the target;16 and for failure to disclose the amount of a 
judgment won by the target against the offeror, despite disclosure of 
the dispute.17 Injunctions have also been granted because of an 
offeror's late filing under section 13(d).18 This spate of 1973 deci-
sions must be read and understood to complete the tender offer pic-
ture sketched as of August 1972 by Aranow and Einhorn.19 
The need for an early supplement to Tender Offers for Corporate 
Control is highlighted by the necessary omission of the 1973 land-
mark decision of the Second Circuit in Chris-Craft Industries v. Piper 
Aircraft Corporation.20 The contest between Chris-Craft and Bangor 
15. General Host Corp. v. Triumph Am., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See 
also Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, CCH Fm,. SEC. L. REP. ,r 94,088 (3d 
Cir. 1973). 
16. Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone &: Sons, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y.), a/fd., 
CCH Fm,. SEc. L. REP. ,r 94,196 (2d Cir. 1973). In this case the offeror was permitted to 
revise its disclosures to comply with the injunction, republish, and continue the offer, 
giving previous tenderors the option to withdraw. The Second Circuit, recognizing the 
effects of the earlier decisions, rejected the argument that nondeliberate section 14(e) 
disclosure violations should be punished by disqualification of the offeror. For the 
offeror who is not precluded by market or financing considerations from continuing its 
offer, this represents a tipping of the scale back toward evenhanded treatment of 
offeror and target. 
17. Sonesta Intl. Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, CCH FED. SEC, L. REP. 
,r 94,041 (2d Cir. 1973). 
18. Water & Wall Associates, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., CCH Fm,. SEc. L. 
REP. ,r 94,943 (D.N.J. 1973). Cf. Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, CCH Fm,. SEC. L. 
REP. ,I 93,971 (W .D. Wis. 1973). 
19. A very recent decision creates even more uncertainty. In Texasgulf, Inc. v. 
Canada Dev. Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 94,160 (S.D. Tex. 1973), the court 
rejected, after a hearing on the facts, Texasgulf's (target) claims that Canada Develop-
ment Corporation violated sections 14(d) and 14(e) by failing to disclose (I) that the 
acquisition of shares of the target might be an antitrust violation; (2) that the acquisi-
tion of shares of the target might be in violation of the state corporation statutes; 
(3) that the acquisition of shares of the target might be in violation of the Federal 
Communications Act, and thereby result in loss of valuable communciation assets; 
(4) the conflict of interest existing between target and tender offeror; (5) the plans for 
management changes and possible disposition of target's assets; (6) that the acquisition 
of shares of the target might result in adverse effects to target's overseas operations; 
(7) that the acquisition of shares of the target would cause target to become ineligible 
for certain insurance, finance, and other programs offered in connection with invest-
ments in less developed countries; and (8) the identity of persons allegedly acting in 
concert with it. The case is of particular interest for the court's approval of amended 
offering document disclosure to "cure" prior "defects." 
For an interesting opinion on determining the status of a tender offer as a contract, 
see Lowenschuss v. Berry, 73 Civ. 2021 (S.D.N.Y., July 1973), in which the court held 
that a tender offer "is ••• a solicitation of offers from the tendering parties or in other 
words an 'offer for an offer' "; and that, assuming that a tender offer constitutes a 
contract, if the tender offer is enjoined for violation of section 14(e) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, performance of the contract would be impossible, and, therefore, 
there would be no breach of contract. 
20. (1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC, L. REP. 193,816 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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Punta to take over Piper Aircraft Corporation is a classic in terms 
of the strategems employed by the contestants and the multitude of 
legal issues raised in the three-way takeover war. While the book dis-
cusses the earlier cases in the Piper War, its 1972 cutoff date omits 
this latest opinion, which encompasses the earlier skirmishes and 
reverses a number of the lower court holdings discussed in the book. 
In addition to holding that the defeated offeror may bring a damage 
action against the management of the target, the competing offeror, 
and the underwriter for the competing offeror for their Williams 
Act violations, the Second Circuit opinion establishes the standards 
of materiality, disclosure, and due diligence that are to be applied 
under the Act. The opinion also sustains the right of the SEC to 
obtain the ancillary relief of a rescission order, on behalf of tender-
ing shareholders, against offerors who have violated the antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws. 
Although the book is comprehensive with regard to pre-1973 law, 
one topic treated summarily, and to this reader unsatisfactorily, by 
Aranow and Einhorn is the so-called "creeping tender offer" theory 
-the integration of the purchases of the target's stock made before 
the announcement of the formal tender offer with the formal tender 
offer so as to make the early purchases violations of the Williams 
Act. The authors reject the theory categorically. They also deny 
that the federal securities laws require an offeror to disclose its in-
tent to make a future tender offer before making open-market pur-
chases: "The laws could hardly be otherwise unless one were willing 
to accept the ludicrous result of requiring every investor that in-
tended to make substantial purchases of a security to disclose such 
intention prior to its initial purchase" (p. 73). 
While existing precedent supports the Aranow and Einhorn posi-
tion on creeping tender offers, the argument to the contrary cannot 
be so lightly dismissed. Indeed, in a case where the prior determina-
tion to make a tender offer is clearly established, it would not be 
surprising to see a court reach the opposite result and, for Williams 
Act purposes, integrate preannouncement open-market purchases 
with the formal offer.21 Once a tender offer has been made both the 
21. Compare Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 
1066 (S.D.N.Y.), afjd., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); General Host Corp. v. Triumph 
Am., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (rejecting the argument that pre-formal 
announcement purchases of less than five per cent of the shares of the target require 
Williams Act disclosure) and Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., CCH FED. SEC, 
L. REP. 1f 94,160 (S.D. Tex. 1973) ("Thus, it is evident that CDC's [Canada Devel• 
opment Corporation] undisclosed purchase and conscious avoidance of the 5% trigger• 
ing requirement, whether alone or together with Noranda, are not a violation of the 
law." ,r 94,160, at 94,684.) with Griffith & Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law 90-439 
-Growing Pains? Some Interpretations with Respect to the Williams Act, 16 How. 
L.J. 654, 700-01 (1971): the integration theory underlying the SEC staff position in its 
interpretative letter with respect to Cattlemen's Inv. Co. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] 
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1[ 78,775 Gan. 4, 1972) and Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 
F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (holding that the legislative history of the Williams 
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Williams Act and rule IOb-1322 require equality of treatment of 
shareholders. Arguably, the policy considerations underlying these 
provisions are equally applicable to the shareholders who sell the 
first five per cent of the target's stock to the offeror. Acceptance of 
these policy considerations would require integration of the pre-
announcement purchases with the tender offer. 
The creeping tender offer also raises the question whether rule 
IOb-523 requires disclosure of the prospective offeror's intentions 
before it makes purchases in the open market.24 This issue is not 
adequately considered in the book.25 Unfortunately, there is no direct 
precedent on this question. Nor is there any direct precedent on 
the related question whether, apart from the intention to make a 
formal tender offer in the future, the immediate intention to engage 
in a substantial buying program, at prices contemplated to be in 
excess of the current market price or in a market situation where 
the buying program may reasonably be expected to result in higher 
prices, in and of itself requires disclosure. 
The answer to these questions is rooted in the answer to the more 
fundamental question of whether rule IOb-5 requires-or should re-
quire-that the parties to a securities transaction, under all circum-
stances, inform each other of all nonpublic material facts of which 
they know. In short, does rule I0b-5 require parity of information 
for all market participants?26 It seems clear that the objective of a 
Act establishes the congressional intent that the Williams Act cover other techniques 
for accumulating large blocks as well as conventional tender offers). See also Water &: 
Wall Associates, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 'If 93,943 
(D.N.J. 1973) (rejecting, without consideration of the arguments, open-market purchases 
for the purpose of control as constituting a tender offer); Mosinee Paper Corp. v. 
Rondeau, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 'If 93,971, at 93,888 (W.D. Wis. 1973) (questioning 
whether a series of open-market purchases exceeding in the aggregate five per cent 
should be construed as a tender offer). 
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.IO(b)-13 (1973). 
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.IO(b)-5 (1973). 
24. The SEC releases on rule IOb-13 show that the SEC contemplated that nondis-
closure of intent to make a tender offer after open-market purchases could be a 
violation of rule lOb-5 and other antifraud and antimanipulation provisions. In SEC 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8595, at 2 (May 5, 1969), (1969-1970 Transfer 
Binder] CCH F.ED. SEC. L. REP. 'If 77,706, at 83,617, proposing rule lOb-13, the SEC said: 
"Such pre-tender purchases, of course, would be subject to the provisions of Rule IOb-5 
under the Act." In SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8712, at 2 (Oct. 8, 1969), 
(1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 'If 77,745, at 83,709, adopting rule 
lOb-13, the SEC said: "Of course, the general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation pro-
visions could apply to such pre-tender purchases." 
25. If disclosure of preannouncement open-market purchases is required by rule 
I0b-5 or the other antifraud provisions, such disclosure would presumably tip the 
balance on the tender offer definition question. The SEC staff has taken the position 
that announcement of a tender offer to be made in the future starts the tender offer 
period and triggers the applicability of rule lOb-13. United Brands Co., (1972-1973 
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 'If 79,268 (Dec. 19, 1972); Allied Prods. Corp., 
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 'If 79,375 (March 21, 1973). 
26. The basic question as recently posed by the SEC is, "whether and to what extent 
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normally functioning market should override the parity-of-informa-
tion principle when normal accumulations of investment position 
selected, nonpublic knowledge about the existing or future market in particular securi-
ties should be treated as material information which must be disclosed by securities 
professionals or other persons prior to any transactions in those securities." SEC Securi-
ties Exchange Act Release No. 10316 (Aug. 1, 1973), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 79,446, at 
83,263. In Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to 
Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 818 (1973), the authors reach the 
conclusion that the parity-of-information approach is too restrictive: it would depart 
significantly "from an underlying assumption of a competitive economy that it is 
desirable, on the whole, to reward the diligent who have acquired a superior market 
position." As an alternative the authors suggest a fairness test, which "would permit 
the user of material, nonpublic information to show that his exploitation of that 
information represented a legitimate reward for the economic effort by him or the 
person who provided him the information," but they conclude that even this would be 
too restrictive and adhere instead to a test based on a special relationship between the 
parties and an independent duty to disclose. Dicta in recent cases, the theory under• 
lying recent SEC complaints, the broad sweep given to rule I0b-5 by the Supreme 
Court in Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), and 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), and the public concern 
with achieving fairness in the securities markets indicate that the parity-of-information 
rule may ultimately emerge as the standard. In Birdman v. Electro-Catheter Corp., 
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 93,934 (E.D. Pa. 1973), while discussing the failure to disclose 
the potential market impact of the contemplated sale of shares by insiders, the court 
came very close to a parity-of-information test in saying: "The omission of such infor-
mation, if material, would thwart the basic policy of Rule IOb-5 ••• which is that all 
investors have relatively equal access to material information." 11 93,934, at 93,725-26, 
Other cases that, although distinguishable on their facts, may be said to accept the 
parity-of-information principle are SEC v. Great Am. Indus., 407 F.2d 453 (2d 
Cir. 1968) (concurring opinion); Landy v. FDIC, CCH FED, SEC. L. REP. 11 94,094 (3d 
Cir. 1973); Courtland v. Walston &: Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The parity• 
of-information test accords with present day expectations. When rule IOb-5 was 
adopted, the public had not yet been invited in. The market consisted of professionals, 
~semipros, and those who liked to think of themselves as semipros. The vast majority 
of people "in the market" did not expect parity of market information. At most, they 
expected not to be defrauded by insiders with knowledge of material changes in things 
like earnings or dividends. After the public was invited in, expectations changed. The 
public expects evenhanded fairness and does not distinguish losses arising out of non-
disclosure of market information from those arising out of nondisclosure of corporate 
information. It is evident today that the Congress and the SEC are responding to this 
public expectation, and the courts may do likewise. In tbis connection, Crane Co. v, 
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), should be kept in mind, ln 
finding a rule IOb-5 violation in failure to disclose the offeror's market activities in the 
target company's stock, the court felt constrained to find an "insider'' relationship, The 
court "reasoned" that the tender offeror was an "insider" with respect to the trading in 
the target's stock even though such information peculiarly concerned the tender offeror 
and not the target. As in many judicial developments, the courts may reach parity-of. 
information results before the principle itself is fully recognized and adopted. 
A recent White Paper, COMPANY LAw REForo.r, Cor.lND. No. 5391, at 8 (1973), con-
tains an excellent statement of the philosophy of the parity-of-information principle: 
Unfair profits can on occasion be made in share dealings by the improper use 
of confidential, price-sensitive information that is not generally available to the 
investing public. This is prima facie most likely to happen in a bid, or expected 
bid, situation, but in principle it can happen at any time. The efficient operation 
of the market as a source of capital, as a measure of industrial success and hence 
as a means of achieving a desirable and efficient disposition of resources, requires 
that relevant information should be fairly available, and that all investors should 
be able to back their knowledge and judgment rather than that favoured indivi-
duals should be able to take private advantage of confidential information. These 
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are involved. Proposed rule 13e-2,27 regarding corporate repurchase 
programs, is a good analogy. If a buying program is not likely and 
the buyer does not intend to affect the market price, disclosure 
should not be required. However, if market conditions or the buyer's 
intentions are such that it knows, or reasonably should know, that 
its transactions will have a material effect on the market price, there 
is a substantial question as to whether disclosure should be required. 
Having rejected both integration and rule lOb-5 disclosure in 
connection with preannouncement open-market purchases, Aranow 
and Einhorn do not face the difficult issues of when it is appropriate 
to apply the integration concept and what is material information in 
this context. In most situations, the buyer's intention is not formu-
lated at the time of the initial purchases. Rather, the buyer gener-
ally tests the market, determines the dimensions of the buying pro-
gram, and then decides whether or not to make a tender offer on the 
basis of "how the market acts." This creates a question of fact as to 
the buyer's real intention at the time of the initial purchases or, 
assuming that the buyer's intention was fluid, a question as to the 
materiality of the information that a buyer who might make a tender 
offer is testing the market. Where open market purchases are made 
without any intention to make a tender offer and the investor sub-
sequently changes its mind and decides to make a tender offer, the 
open-market purchases should not be integrated with the later offer. 
Aranow and Einhorn also do not treat specifically another of the 
most intriguing questions under the Williams Act-open-market pur-
chases by a third party to defeat a tender offer. A possible scenario 
is: Target, listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), has 
2,000,000 shares outstanding. Target stock has recently been trading 
at twenty dollars per share. Offeror makes the requisite filing under 
the Williams Act and announces a tender offer for all Target shares 
at twenty-six dollars per share, conditioned on obtaining not less 
than 1,000,000 shares. The price of Target on the NYSE goes to 
twenty-five and one quarter. The next day, Competitor, without any 
prior disclosure or announcement of its intentions, commences to 
purchase Target shares on the NYSE; it intends to buy 1,000,000 
requirements have so far been fulfilled by the application of the rules of the Stock 
Exchange and, in bid situations, by the Take-Over Panel. Without implying that 
malpractice bas been widespread, the Government have concluded that it is neces-
sary for the voluntary system to be reinforced by statute so as to ensure, as far as 
practically possible, that the market operates freely on the basis of equality 
be~veen buyer and seller. Care must of course be taken to avoid unduly inhibiting 
the flexibility of the market. But the general desirability of ensuring equality of 
information to all potential or actual investors, and hence a proper disposition of 
the resources available to those investors, must have a high priority. The suc-
cessful operation of the system demands a high degree of confidence in fair 
dealing on the Stock Exchange, and indeed in securities generally, whether or not 
publicly quoted. 
27. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8930 Uuly 13, 1970), 2 CCH FED. SEC. 
L. REP, 1J 26,854 (1970). 
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shares and thereby defeat Offeror's bid and gain control of Target 
for itself. After buying 500,000 shares at prices between twenty-five 
and one half and twenty-six and one eighth, Competitor issues a 
press release that states its intention to continue to buy Target shares 
until it has 1,000,000 shares. During the next few days, Competi-
tor buys the other 500,000 shares at prices between twenty-five 
and one half and twenty-six and one half. All of Competitor's pur-
chases are in transactions on the floor of the NYSE by a broker con-
tinuously bidding on behalf of Competitor and continuously accept-
ing all offers at its current bid. Competitor does not in any way 
(other than through its press release) communicate directly with 
Target shareholders. Competitor does not file under the Williams 
Act until after it has completed all of its purchases. It then files, 
within the specified ten-day period, a schedule 13D.28 Following 
Competitor's press release, a number of brokers voluntarily contact 
Target shareholders to advise them to sell immediately because 
Offeror's bid appears to be defeated and the brokers expect the price 
of Target to return to twenty when Competitor completes its buy-
ing program. A number of market professionals reach the same con-
clusion and decide that making short sales of Target stock to Com-
petitor is a "sure thing" in that, when Competitor stops buying 
after accumulating 1,000,000 shares as announced, they will be able 
to cover at lower prices.29 The number of shares tendered to Offeror 
falls far short of 1,000,000, and it terminates its offer and returns all 
shares tendered. The market price of Target drops to the pre-tender 
off er level. 
Without making prior announcement, and without complying 
with the Williams Act, Competitor, using the umbrella of Offeror's 
bid (Offeror, having announced a tender offer, was precluded by 
rule IOb-13 from buying on the floor of the NYSE in competition 
with Competitor), was able to acquire 1,000,000 shares of Target 
and defeat Offeror. In so doing, Competitor did not accord potential 
sellers pro rata treatment and did not disclose its future plans for 
Target-but did afford market professionals the opportunity for a 
speedy short-sale profit. The real victims of Competitor's unregu-
lated buying program were the unsophisticated public shareholders 
of Target who were unable to act fast enough to sell to Competitor 
at twenty-six plus. These shareholders, unable to obtain the twenty-
six dollar tender offer price from Offeror and not appreciating the 
temporary nature of the increase in market price above Offeror's 
offer, were left with shares at a market value substantially less than 
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.I3d-101 (1973). 
29. Announcement of a third offer for all Target shares at a price higher than 26 
or an increase in Offerer's bid is the only danger faced by the short seUers, and this is 
unlikely after Competitor has already acquired more than 25 per cent of the out-
standing shares. 
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the trading prices that prevailed during Competitor's buying program. 
Clearly Competitor's action resulted in unfairness and injury to 
the public shareholders of Target. The only question is whether such 
action is remediable under the federal securities laws-whether the 
conduct of Competitor violated the Williams Act, as well as rules 
l0b-5 and IOb-13. Notwithstanding the Aranow and Einhorn posi-
tion on creeping tender offers and the 1973 cases that refuse to out-
law open-market purchases as tender offers, if the purposes of the 
Williams Act are to be achieved, large-scale open-market purchases 
to obtain control should be held to be tender offers. Where such 
purchases are made for the purpose of defeating another's tender 
offer, the argument for finding them to be a tender offer is com-
pelling. To hold that these purchases are not tender offers is to 
handicap severely the person making the formal tender offer in 
compliance with the Williams Act and to subject the public share-
holders to the disadvantages that the Williams Act was intended to 
remedy.30 In addition, independent of the question of the definition 
of a tender offer, such purchases should also be held to violate rule 
14d-4,31 which requires compliance with the Williams Act disclosure 
provisions by those attempting to defeat tender offers. 
Despite its unfortunate cutoff date and its summary treatment 
of a few points, Tender Offers for Corporate Control is a significant 
contribution to the literature on securities regulation. It is a handy 
starting place and a good research resource in the tender offer field. 
No well-rounded library should be without it. 
Martin Lipton, 
Member, New York Bar, 
Adjunct Professor of Law, 
New York University 
30. See Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer'' under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REY. 1250, 1275 (1973), in which it is suggested that 
the appropriate basis on which to determine what is a tender offer is the impact on 
the shareholders of the target; if the effect is substantially the same as a conventional 
tender offer, it is a "tender offer." The American Law Institute's proposed Federal 
Securities Code would define a "tender request" in terms of an offer to more than 35 
persons, without regard to the manner of the offer. ALI FED. SEC. CoDE § 299.9 (Tent. 
Draft No. I, 1972). 
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1973), 
